

Determinants of Attitudes Toward Transitional Justice: An Empirical Analysis of the Spanish Case

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Abstract

Much has been said about the institutional determinants of transitional justice (TJ), yet scholars still know little about the determinants of citizens' attitudes toward restorative policies aimed at addressing human rights violations of the past. This article draws on an original survey of a representative sample of Spanish citizens conducted in 2008. One year earlier, the Spanish socialist government had approved the so-called Law of Historical Memory, aimed at providing restitution for victims of the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) and the Francoist dictatorship (1939–1975). We analyze individual-level attitudes toward a set of TJ policies (i.e., truth commissions, trials, and symbolic reparations) in a comprehensive overview of the field. We study the effects of different sets of variables: individual sociodemographic and ideological factors, family and socialization variables, and context-related factors. Individual ideology, family victimization during the dictatorship, and regional context appear highly relevant in explaining individual attitudes toward TJ policies.

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The expression *transitional justice* (hereafter, TJ) refers to a set of procedures that are predominantly adopted during democratization periods—but also sometimes when democracy has been consolidated (Aguilar, 2008b; Thoms, Ron, & Paris, 2008)—to deal with atrocities committed by the former regime or during a violent conflict. TJ procedures fall into three broad categories: (a) justice measures aimed at punishing former perpetrators for human rights violations or depriving them of illegitimate privileges, (b) policies aimed at providing material and/or symbolic reparation for victims, and (c) truth revelation procedures.¹

The study of TJ policies is a burgeoning field of social research, but there are still a number of lacunae to be filled. For example, although the vast majority of the literature on TJ has focused on explaining the institutional determinants of these policies or on the normative discussion about their desirability,² there has been little research on public opinion regarding TJ. In some existing works, the opinion of citizens has been inferred from the pressures exerted by social organizations (Skaar, 1999). This is problematic because it cannot be assumed that there is a direct relationship between the demands promoted by organizations or pressure groups and the general preferences of the citizenry.³ Moreover, many of the existing scholarly contributions on bottom-up demands for TJ draw on ethnographic research including interviews and/or observational participation (Ferreira, 1999; Theidon, 2006), interviews with specific focus groups (Grodsky, 2008; International Center for Transitional Justice [ICTJ], 2004; Martín Beristain, 2008; Strover & Weinstein, 2004), or interviews with particular subgroups of the overall population, for example, victims (Espinoza Cuevas, Ortiz Rojas, & Rojas Baeza, 2003; ICTJ, 2008) or pressure groups (Backer, 2003).

In short, barring very few exceptions, scholars have not relied on systematic generalizable evidence of individual attitudes toward TJ policies.⁴ In this article, we make a twofold empirical contribution to this literature: First, we explore data from a hitherto unexploited representative survey of the Spanish population, which we designed and implemented by the Spanish Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (hereafter, CIS) in April 2008; second, this survey is a monographic study, which provides us with detailed information on different TJ measures (i.e., commissions, trials, and symbolic reparations) as well as on a number of independent and control variables. This type of fine-grained data is a valuable resource from which we gain empirical leverage.

At the theoretical level, this article contributes to a better understanding of TJ by presenting a set of hypotheses on the determinants of individual-level

attitudes to these policies, which are grounded in the TJ literature and also in the literature on victimization and intergenerational transmission of identities. The latter is particularly relevant for understanding the Spanish case, where the most traumatic and violent events are not recent (the Civil War ended 70 years ago, the dictatorship more than 30 years ago), and therefore a vast majority of the population did not experience the violations firsthand. Even though we focus on the Spanish case, we intend to generate implications for other transitional and post-transitional countries that share some basic characteristics with Spain.

This article is organized as follows: In the second section we introduce the Spanish case and outline its importance for the study of transitional justice and post-transitional justice. In the third section we present the theoretical framework and hypotheses, which we empirically test in the fourth section. To conclude, we discuss our findings and their implications for other cases.

Transitional Justice in Spain

The Spanish case is particularly appropriate for TJ research: the severe brutality and prolonged violations perpetrated by the Franco regime against those on the losing side in the Civil War (1936-1939) and against all those who subsequently refused to comply with its dictates (1939-1975) are well known. Throughout the civil conflict, tens of thousands of people on both sides lost their lives as a result of both legal and extrajudicial executions.⁵ However, political violence continued during the early years of the postwar period; estimations suggest that the Franco regime executed approximately 50,000 people, that the number of prisoners in concentration camps amounted to 300,000, and that hundreds of thousands were forced into exile. Throughout Franco's entire rule, tens of thousands of people who had been expelled from their jobs after the war as a result of their ideological leanings were systematically denied reinstatement. The regime also refused to offer pensions or any compensation whatsoever not only to war-disabled veterans and civilians but also to the widows and orphans of defeated combatants. Likewise, political parties, trade unions, and private individuals had their assets seized simply for having sympathized with the Second Republic (1931-1936); meanwhile, those who had supported the victors enjoyed numerous perks and privileges.

After Franco's death, the presence of the traumatic memory of the Civil War and the obsessive desire to avoid its repetition encouraged the main political actors and the majority of Spanish citizens to look to the future by putting aside the thorniest aspects of the past. It was firmly believed that this was the only way to ensure a peaceful transition to democracy (Aguilar, 2002, 2008a). As in other cases—Chile, Uruguay, and Hungary—political

elites reached a tacit agreement to leave the dictatorial past out of the political debate. In this context, the Parliament enacted the Amnesty Law of October 15, 1977, whose purpose was to free political prisoners and to shield the dictatorial past from any judicial proceedings.

Among the myriad possible TJ policies that could have been adopted during the transition to democracy, only material reparation measures targeting Civil War losers were approved. These policies were limited and fragmented. TJ measures such as official condemnation of the dictatorship, symbolic measures aimed at the reparation of all the victims of the dictatorship, the creation of a truth commission, and the quashing of Francoist trials—not to mention bringing perpetrators of human rights violations to trial—were never implemented. Nevertheless, when most Spaniards thought that the most painful episodes of their history had been buried once and for all, the past erupted again: In 2000 a private association devoted to the task of locating and exhuming mass graves dating from the Civil War (called the *Asociación para la Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica*) triggered a social and political debate about the shortcomings of previous TJ policies.⁶

In this context, the conservative social and statewide political forces (e.g., the *Partido Popular*) positioned themselves against “digging into the past.” In contrast, the most progressive political parties and social associations (e.g., the *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* and the political federation led by the former communists, *Izquierda Unida*) were in favor of them. The most important quantitative and qualitative leap forward in relation to TJ legislation took place during the 2004–2008 legislative term, especially with the passing of “Law 52/2007, of 26th December,” which “recognizes and broadens the rights and establishes measures in favor of those who suffered persecution or violence during the Civil War and the dictatorship.”⁷

Our survey was conducted in the immediate aftermath of the heated debate that accompanied the passing of this law. In this context, Spaniards had diverging opinions toward TJ measures; we wonder what explains them. First, one could argue that individual characteristics such as ideology influenced opinions on the issue: Leftist sympathizers and militants were probably more supportive of a law that was being promoted by a left-wing party. Second, personal experiences that proved relevant in explaining preferences toward TJ in other contexts could only partially explain these attitudes;⁸ most of the Spanish population in 2007 had not experienced the Civil War firsthand, whereas people younger than 30 did not have any experience of even the dictatorship. Third, since reparation policies in the 2007 Law of Historical Memory did not focus on monetary compensation to victimized people, greed and self-interest were irrelevant in this context. Finally, regional factors

could also have been important: People living in particular regions may have had different perspectives on TJ owing to their different collective histories during the Civil War and the dictatorship and also because of their current ethnic identities.

Theoretical Framework

In this article, we argue that attitudes to TJ are determined by a combination of individual, family, and context-related (i.e., regional) factors. Over the following pages, we outline the theoretical significance of each of these factors and the different mechanisms through which they are likely to have an impact on attitudes toward TJ.

Individual Factors

Individual characteristics are essential in explaining variation in political views; the list of relevant individual-level factors explaining variation in attitudes toward TJ is potentially endless. Therefore, we concentrate on only those we deem most relevant theoretically.

The respondent's age is an obvious factor in explaining differences in political views. With regard to TJ on past events, one would expect older people to be more reluctant to support reparation policies because of their personal proximity to traumatic events. The mechanism driving this is fear, which might be operating more or less specifically: On one hand, people may have a specific fear of reprisal from those who would be negatively affected by these policies (i.e., ex-victimizers);⁹ on the other hand, people may have a more general fear of a return of the conflict or the authoritarian regime (Nalepa, 2007). Although it could be argued that direct memories of traumatic events could also be stimulating a desire for reparations, we expect risk aversion to prevail among those who witnessed the civil conflict or the ancien régime.¹⁰ Furthermore, with regard to the specific fear of reprisal, we can expect it to have a differential impact on TJ preferences depending on contextual factors such as the size of the locality where the individual lives: In larger municipalities, anonymity is greater than in smaller towns; in smaller settings, politics is more personal, and people are more likely to feel that reparation policies may have specific (i.e., negative) consequences for their own safety.

The way individuals evaluate TJ measures should be clearly determined by their ability to understand not only the past in general but also key historical events. Education is probably the single most important individual characteristic

accounting for differences in the extent to which individuals are able to do so, yet it may not be the only one; interest in politics might also play a role in their ability to evaluate these policies. For obvious reasons, individuals may have different views about TJ depending on their self-placement on the ideological axis. The direction of the effect will depend on the country's history, including the trajectory of its political parties.¹¹ Finally, religiosity and/or ethnicity are other individual characteristics to be considered insofar as victimization affects religious and/or ethnic groups unevenly.

Socialization and Family Factors

The traditional focus of sociologists on the impact of family views and values in the formation of individual perceptions about life is reasonably intuitive. The literature on intergenerational transmission of political views underwent rapid growth in the seventies when Styskal and Sullivan (1975) concluded,

Parents—the most trusted and revered of individuals in a person's early years—are the single most important force in transmitting party identification . . . that choice of party, the substantive meaning of the party for the individual and the individual's orientation toward issues are more the products of loyalties derived from parents early in one's life, when cognitive processes are relatively underdeveloped, than the result of reflective decisions about alternatives in the political arena. (pp. 516-517)

Indeed, despite the popular belief that during adolescence children will turn away from their parents in search of alternative guidance for value orientation, most empirical research reveals a striking concordance between the worldviews of parents and those of their (adult) children (Acock & Bengtson, 1980; Beck & Jennings, 1991; Dalhouse & Frideres, 1996; Jennings & Niemi, 1974, 1981; Jennings, Stoker, & Bowers, 2009; Miller & Glass, 1989). Thus, individuals are expected to favor TJ policies to the extent that their parents do so. Moreover, we might argue that individuals will favor TJ policies if they adopt the condition of "victim" from their ancestors.

Psychological effects of violence and other forms of victimization have been widely studied in the academic literature on conflict (e.g., the well-known post-traumatic stress disorder, or PTSD). However, the specific effects of traumatic experiences on individuals' identities and behavior have generally been overlooked (Balcels, 2007), partly because of a lack of appropriate data for conducting empirical analyses. Although the recent development of

surveys and experiments in postwar settings has prompted the development of empirical studies tackling these issues, the evidence is still quite fragmented and refers mainly to the short-term effects of traumatic events (e.g., Bellows & Miguel, 2008). Neither do we find a much better state of the art in the study of individual experiences of dictatorships and their subsequent preferences and opinions, both during and after democratization processes. This literature has usually focused on the role of political activists or highly committed individuals (Ferreira, 1999; Maravall, 1978), with only some recent developments concerning rank-and-file individuals (Wittenberg, 2006).

Thus, the existing literature cannot provide an answer to the question of whether victimization generates long-term consequences on attitudes toward TJ measures. Nevertheless, it can be argued that, given the positive impact of personal victimization on support for reparation policies on a short-term basis (Biro et al., 2004; Gibson, 2002, 2004a, 2004b, 2007; Nalepa, 2007), victimizing experiences of family ancestors should also lead to favorable attitudes regarding reparation policies. The mechanism leading toward an intergenerational transmission of these attitudes should be the same as that which explains intergenerational transmission of political identities. In short, we can formulate the conjecture that victimization is a condition that is transmitted to descendants through socialization processes.

Contextual Factors

The literature has nevertheless found that the family is not the only socialization source for individuals: adult resocialization experiences (both individual—partner, friends—and contextual) can erode the primary socialization effects of the parents. Thus, the broader context in which the individual lives, works, and relates to other people can also have an influence on attitudes toward policies. Contextual factors can be varied and complex, as are the mechanisms through which they operate; a clear contextual variable, albeit not the only one, is the individual's political community, for example, the locality or the region. Within the community, the individual interacts according to a particular set of cultural repertoires and discourses, and there is peer reinforcement of these discourses. Irrespective of individual and family factors, if the citizens of a particular region or locality perceive that they have been distinctively victimized, we may think that they will hold more favorable attitudes toward TJ policies than elsewhere.

Figure 1 summarizes the combination of factors that, according to our framework, should have an impact on individual preferences for TJ, and which should explain variations in these preferences among individuals.




Figure 1. Determinants of transitional justice (TJ) policies

Although depicted as independently affecting preferences, these factors may also be intermingled: For instance, socialization within the family can be affected by contextual factors (i.e., socialization and transmission of victimization within families may vary across regions). However, given the endless list of connections that could be drawn, and the impossibility of generating clear-cut observable implications for each of these interactions, we treat them as independent factors.¹²

Empirical Test

In this section we verify the explanatory power of each of the factors indicated above by examining data from the aforementioned CIS survey, which sampled 2,936 respondents throughout the country and is representative of the older than 18 Spanish population.¹³ Conducted over a 10-day period through face-to-face interviews lasting around 30 minutes, this monographic survey on “historical memory” included 70 questions about historical and political knowledge, political attitudes and behavior, and sociodemographic characteristics.

Following a common practice in the literature, we operationalized support for three different types of TJ measures with different survey questions:

1. For attitudes toward the creation of a truth commission to inquire into past abuses: “From your point of view, should an investigation commission (independent from the government) be created in order to clarify human rights violations that took place under Francoism?”¹⁴
2. For attitudes toward trials to judge those responsible for past human rights violations: “Should the authorities that violated human rights under Francoism be brought to trial/judged?”¹⁵
3. For attitudes toward symbolic reparations, we used responses (agree–disagree) to the following statement: “Symbols that pay tribute to Franco and Francoism should be withdrawn from public spaces.”¹⁶

To test our hypotheses, we include three subsets of independent and control variables in a set of stepwise binary and ordinal logistic regressions. We include a first set of independent variables measuring individual characteristics:

1. *Age*: We expect older respondents to be more reluctant to support TJ measures; we also expect to find some sort of interaction between age and the size of the respondent’s locality because of the anonymity provided by large localities.¹⁷
2. *Interest in politics*: We expect exposure to the public debate concerning the Law of Historical Memory to promote clear-cut positions on the issue.¹⁸ We include this variable as a control.¹⁹
3. *Education*: Education increases the individual’s sophistication and thus her or his ability to formulate her or his own views about past events.²⁰
4. *Religiosity*: The religious division was significant in the context of the Spanish Civil War and the dictatorship—on one hand, members of the clergy were victims of leftist violence during the conflict; on the other, the Catholic Church sided with Franco during the Civil War and the dictatorship.²¹ Thus, we expect religiosity to have a negative impact on support for TJ measures.²²
5. *Ideology*: We expect a clear-cut negative effect of right-wing ideology on support for TJ policies.²³

We include a second set of variables proxying family characteristics and socialization:

1. *Family identity during the Civil War*: Those whose family identified with the Nationalists during the Civil War should be more negative toward TJ policies, and vice versa.²⁴
2. *Family talked about politics*: This variable is included in order to control for the extent to which politics being discussed at home may influence the intergenerational transmission of identities and victimization.²⁵
3. *Father's ideology*: This variable captures the parents' ideology: We expect a negative impact of right-wing parent ideology on support for TJ.²⁶
4. *Family or individual victimization*: We take into account victimization both by the Francoist side in the Civil War and by the Francoist dictatorship.²⁷ The two variables included in the regressions are (a) *victimization during the Civil War*, a dummy with a value of 1 if the respondent argues that she or he or a member of her or his family was victimized by the Francoist side during the Civil War and a value of 0 if not,²⁸ and (b) *victimization during the dictatorship*, a dummy with a value of 1 if the respondent argues that she or he or any member of the family was victimized by the Francoist dictatorship and a value of 0 if not.²⁹ We expect people whose ancestors (or who themselves) have been victimized to be more supportive of TJ.³⁰ Victimization experiences should also have a differential effect depending on the individual's age: The older the person is, the more intensely she or he will feel the victimizing experience. We test this with an interaction term in the regression models.

A final set of variables is intended to measure contextual factors. As previously stated, we focus on the regional level. The Francoist dictatorship strongly repressed cultural and linguistic minorities within Spain; this led to a collective sense of victimization among these groups, which has persisted through time. Given that our survey has representative subsamples for the Basque Country and Catalonia³¹—two territories with the most distinguishable ethnic identities and strongest sense of collective victimization in Spain—we can easily incorporate a regional dummy variable into our regressions. In this respect, we expect (a) Basque Country and (b) Catalonia dummies to have a positive effect on support for all TJ measures.

Figures 2-4 show the distribution of the sample responses in the different items constituting our three dependent variables: the creation of a truth




Figure 2. Support for the creation of a truth commission to investigate human rights violations under Francoism
Note: DK = Does not know; NA = Does not answer




Figure 3. Support for trials against authorities that violated human rights under Francoism
Note: DK = Does not know; NA = Does not answer




Figure 4. Support for the withdrawal of monuments paying tribute to Francoism
Note: DK = Does not know; NA = Does not answer

commission to investigate human rights violations under Francoism (*truth commissions*), the organization of trials to judge those responsible for human rights violations during Francoism (*trials*), and the withdrawal from public spaces of symbols paying tribute to Franco and Francoism (*symbols*).

These graphs indicate that, except in the first case (*truth commissions*), Spaniards are overtly supportive of TJ policies. This is interesting, as the strong resistance to the Law of Historical Memory displayed by the main right-wing party in Spain (Partido Popular) and the conservative mass media would lead us to expect a greater degree of opposition to these policies. We also observe that people are more prone to agreeing with symbolic reparations (withdrawal of symbols) than the other two TJ measures (*truth commission*, *trials*). This is rather intuitive and consistent with patterns observed in other cases, for example, in the American South (Sheridan, 2009). In addition, trials receive more support than truth commissions, and truth commissions elicit a greater number of hesitant answers than the other policies.³²

Table 1 shows the results of the first logistic regression analyses for the dependent variable commissions, indicating the likelihood of supporting this particular reparatory measure.³³ Model 0 incorporates an interaction term between age and size of locality, which should allow us to capture the varying effect of age conditional on the degree of anonymity in which individuals

Table 1. Logit Regressions: Creation of a Truth Commission for Investigating Human Rights Violations Under Francoism

Commissions	M0	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
Age effect						
Age	-0.023*** (0.01)	-0.008** (0.00)	-0.006 (0.00)	-0.010*** (0.00)	-0.011*** (0.00)	-0.011*** (0.00)
Town size	-0.144* (0.08)	-0.022 (0.03)	-0.025 (0.03)	-0.027 (0.03)	-0.027 (0.03)	-0.024 (0.03)
Town Size \times Age	0.003* (0.00)					
Individual level						
Interest in politics		0.013 (0.06)	-0.027 (0.06)	-0.053 (0.07)	-0.052 (0.07)	-0.052 (0.07)
Education		-0.110 (0.09)	-0.112 (0.09)	-0.127 (0.09)	-0.126 (0.09)	-0.132 (0.09)
Religiosity		-0.175*** (0.04)	-0.151*** (0.05)	-0.130*** (0.05)	-0.129*** (0.05)	-0.133*** (0.05)
Ideology		-0.340*** (0.03)	-0.287*** (0.04)	-0.288*** (0.04)	-0.288*** (0.04)	-0.286*** (0.04)
Socialization						
Family on Francoist side in Civil War ^a			-0.382** (0.15)	-0.268* (0.16)	-0.266* (0.16)	-0.264* (0.16)
Family on Republican side in Civil War ^a			0.075 (0.13)	0.005 (0.13)	0.003 (0.13)	-0.001 (0.13)
Family talked about politics			0.201*** (0.07)	0.140*** (0.07)	0.139** (0.07)	0.137* (0.07)
Father's ideology			-0.026 (0.03)	-0.029 (0.03)	-0.029 (0.03)	-0.029 (0.03)
Victim of Francoism				0.839*** (0.13)	0.700* (0.36)	0.831*** (0.13)

(continued)

Table 1. (continued)

Commissions	M0	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
Victim of Francoists in the Civil War				0.029 (0.13)	0.030 (0.13)	0.034 (0.13)
Age × Victimization					0.003 (0.01)	
Regional differences ^b						
Catalonia						-0.017 (0.14)
Basque country						0.451* (0.27)
Constant	1.200 (0.35)	2.679 (0.34)	2.160 (0.37)	2.331 (0.38)	2.360*** (0.39)	2.326*** (0.38)
N	1,704	1,704	1,704	1,704	1,704	1,704
χ ²	20.33***	208.84***	229.89***	275.177***	275.349***	278.20***
Akaike information criterion	2346.117	2163.602	2150.561	2109.274	2111.102	2110.250

Logistic regression coefficients (standard errors)

a. The reference category comprises those who said their family sided with both sides during the Civil War.

b. The reference category comprises all other Spaniards.

*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

live. We do not include this interaction in the remaining models. Model 1 includes only individual factors, Models 2-3 add socialization and family factors, Model 4 includes an interaction between age and victimization, and Model 5 completes the specification with context-related variables.

Model 0 in Table 1 reveals an interesting result that confirms our expectations regarding the interaction between respondent's age and size of locality: The main effect of age is negative, that is, the older the respondent, the less likely she or he is to accept the creation of commissions. However, this main effect changes depending on whether the individual lives in a small town or a large city: Older people in large cities are less reluctant to support the creation of commissions than those in small towns (regardless of age, the smaller the town, the more reluctant an individual will be). Again, this can be explained by the fear of negative reactions in smaller (and less anonymous) locations. This interactive effect disappears when controlling for other individual-level variables, especially self-placement on the left-right scale and religiosity.

Our basic expectations about individual-level variables are confirmed by Model 1. The effect of age is again negative and statistically significant; religiosity and ideology are both negatively associated with the likelihood of accepting commissions, which means the more religious and more right-wing the person is, the more reluctant she or he is to support this measure. It is somewhat striking that education and interest in politics are not statistically significant. This could be the result of the fact that the TJ debate, far from being a transversal ideology-free debate, is intensively politicized.

Model 2 tests the impact of family-level ideology factors. It suggests that individuals whose families sided with the Francoists during the Civil War are significantly less prone to accept commissions than other individuals. There are no differences in the propensity of individuals whose families were on the Republican side and those whose families were divided and sided with both sides. Thus, with regard to their family histories, individuals are significantly less likely to accept commissions if they come from a homogeneous Nationalist background; having had at least part of one's family on the Republican side increases acceptance of this measure. The ideology of the respondent's father has no impact on the dependent variable, although the sign of this estimate is as predicted (i.e., negative).

An interesting result drawn from this model is that individuals are more likely to support the creation of commissions when the family used to talk about politics. This could be taken as evidence confirming the importance of socialization in the formation of attitudes toward TJ. Interestingly, this effect decreases after controlling for the victimization variables.

Model 3 tests the family victimization hypotheses. Interestingly, victimization does not appear to be a homogeneous experience. Being a victim of the Francoist army in the Civil War has no impact on our dependent variable. However, individuals reporting experiences of victimization during Francoism are more likely to accept commissions than others; the magnitude of this effect is quite important and is highly statistically significant. Therefore, more recent victimization (i.e., during the dictatorship) appears to be more relevant than victimization during the Civil War. This result is consistent with the fact that the truth commissions would focus on human rights violations committed under the dictatorship and not during the Civil War.

We have tested for the interactive hypotheses between reported victimization and age (Model 4). Our expectation was that the impact of victimization would decrease among younger respondents, yet we cannot fully confirm this conjecture as this interaction is not statistically significant (although it has a positive sign). Thus, victimization seems to be strongly transmitted to new generations: Its impact, which is positive and highly statistically significant, does not change with the respondents' age. Note also that the main effect of age scarcely changes and remains negative in the victimization models; this means that, for those who report past experiences of family victimization, support for TJ is independent of their age.

Finally, Model 5 indicates that Catalan respondents do not differ from those from other regions in their propensity to accept commissions, whereas the Basques are generally more likely to support this sort of reparation.

Table 2 depicts the results for the trials dependent variable. In this case, Model 0 cannot fully confirm our hypothesis regarding the differential effect of age conditional on town size: The interaction is not statistically significant. Model 1 is fairly consistent with its equivalent in Table 1; it confirms the relevance of individual-level explanatory variables: ideology, religiosity, and education (this was not statistically significant in Table 1). More educated people are less supportive of TJ (this variable loses statistical significance in the remaining models).

Model 2 reveals additional differences with respect to what we observed in Table 1: Coming from a family who sided with the Republicans during the Civil War increases the likelihood of supporting trials. And the opposite is also true: Respondents whose families sided with the Francoists are significantly less supportive of trials. Model 3 rejects a general impact of victimization on the acceptance of past perpetrators being brought to trial: Indeed, none of the victimization variables is significant. However, Model 4 reveals a significant interaction between age and reported victimization by the Franco regime: Older respondents reporting victimization are

Table 2. Ordinal Logit Regressions: The Authorities That Violated Human Rights Under Francoism Should Be Brought to Trial

Trials	M0	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
Age effect						
Age	-0.028*** (0.01)	-0.015*** (0.00)	-0.016*** (0.00)	-0.016*** (0.00)	-0.021*** (0.00)	-0.017*** (0.00)
Town size	-0.092 (0.08)	0.030 (0.03)	0.029 (0.03)	0.029 (0.03)	0.027 (0.03)	0.030 (0.03)
Town Size × Age	0.003 (0.00)					
Individual level						
Interest in politics		-0.007 (0.06)	-0.011 (0.06)	-0.013 (0.06)	-0.007 (0.06)	-0.008 (0.06)
Education		-0.144* (0.09)	-0.125 (0.09)	-0.127 (0.09)	-0.122 (0.09)	-0.137 (0.09)
Religiosity		-0.127*** (0.04)	-0.101** (0.04)	-0.100*** (0.04)	-0.093** (0.04)	-0.090** (0.04)
Ideology		-0.325*** (0.03)	-0.264*** (0.04)	-0.263*** (0.04)	-0.260*** (0.04)	-0.251*** (0.04)
Socialization						
Family on			-0.249* (0.14)	-0.243* (0.14)	-0.230 (0.14)	-0.252* (0.14)
Francoist side in Civil War ^a						
Family on			0.363*** (0.13)	0.357*** (0.13)	0.343*** (0.13)	0.297*** (0.13)
Republican side in Civil War ^a						
Family talked about politics			0.025 (0.07)	0.021 (0.07)	0.014 (0.07)	0.011 (0.07)
Father's ideology			-0.015 (0.03)	-0.014 (0.03)	-0.014 (0.03)	-0.016 (0.03)
Victim of Francoism				0.045 (0.12)	-0.732** (0.33)	0.073 (0.12)

(continued)

Table 2. (continued)

Trials	M0	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
Victim of Francoists in Civil War				0.012 (0.12)	0.027 (0.12)	0.002(0.12)
Age × Victimization					0.017** (0.01)	
Regional differences ^b						
Catalonia						0.558*** (0.15)
Basque country						0.969*** (0.28)
Cut Point 1	-1.981 (0.35)	-3.540 (0.33)	-3.146 (0.36)	-3.149 (0.36)	-3.343 (0.37)	-3.061 (0.36)
Cut Point 2	-1.518 (0.35)	-3.032 (0.33)	-2.632 (0.36)	-2.636 (0.36)	-2.828 (0.37)	-2.540 (0.36)
N	1,737	1,737	1,737	1,737	1,737	1,737
χ ²	44.42***	215.54***	233.94***	234.12***	240.65***	259.918***
Akaike information criterion	3129.685	2964.560	2954.169	2957.987	2953.453	2936.186

Logistic regression coefficients (standard errors)

a. The reference category comprises those who said their family sided with both sides during the Civil War.

b. The reference category comprises all other Spaniards.

p* < .1. *p* < .05. ****p* < .01.

significantly more in favor of this measure than the rest of the sample. Older respondents who report no victimization clearly reject holding trials, and younger people reporting victimization also oppose this measure, which indicates that victimization experiences lead to different attitudes toward this reparatory measure depending on the individual's age. In Model 5, both regional dummies are statistically significant. Respondents in the Basque Country and Catalonia are more likely to accept the holding of trials than are respondents in other territories, and this effect is greater in the former territory than in the latter.

Table 3 tests the determinants of attitudes toward symbolic reparation measures; the dependent variable measures approval of the withdrawal of symbols of Francoism. The first model (Model 0) suggests—as in Table 1—that even though older respondents are generally more reluctant to support this symbolic reparation, those living in larger urban areas are less likely to be so. Furthermore, as in Table 1, the only significant sociodemographic variables are—in addition to respondent's age—ideology and religiosity. In this case, the position of the respondent appears to be heavily dependent on family variables (Model 2). Indeed, there is an almost linear association between family leanings in the civil conflict and respondent attitudes regarding this measure: Whenever the respondent recalls a Francoist past in her or his family, her likelihood of accepting this form of symbolic reparation significantly decreases, as compared to those who claim to have roots on both sides. And when the individual comes from a family that fought on the Republican side, she is more likely to accept this reparation, as compared to those whose relatives were divided on both sides. Victimization (Model 3) is more significantly related to our dependent variable than in the previous models (Tables 1 and 2). Both estimates of victimization (victimization by Francoism and by the Nationalist side during the Civil War) are significant here. Interestingly, the interaction between victimization and respondent's age (Model 4) is not significant, implying that this effect is equally important among respondents of all ages. Our final model (Model 5) reconfirms the Basque and Catalan specificity; this regional effect is again stronger in the former region than in the latter.³⁴

A caveat to our empirical results is that the observed effects of victimization on attitudes toward TJ are an artifact of an endogenous relationship between reported victimization and ideology. It could be that those identified with the left are more prone to report past victimization experiences than those who identified with the right. A graphic inspection of the distribution of these two subsamples along the ideological axis allows us to observe that these two subsamples have almost undistinguishable distributions (figure 5).

Table 3. Ordinal Logit Regressions: Symbols Paying Tribute to Francoism Should Be Withdrawn From Public Spaces

Symbols	M0	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
Age effect						
Age	-0.032*** (0.01)	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.003 (0.00)	-0.003 (0.00)
Town size	-0.284*** (0.08)	-0.023 (0.03)	-0.023 (0.03)	-0.025 (0.03)	-0.026 (0.03)	-0.024 (0.03)
Town Size × Age	0.006*** (0.00)					
Individual level						
Interest in politics		0.089 (0.06)	0.103 (0.07)	0.089 (0.07)	0.091 (0.07)	0.093 (0.07)
Education		-0.031 (0.09)	-0.014 (0.09)	-0.032 (0.09)	-0.031 (0.09)	-0.044 (0.09)
Religiosity		-0.250*** (0.04)	-0.220*** (0.04)	-0.209*** (0.04)	-0.208*** (0.04)	-0.203*** (0.04)
Ideology		-0.436*** (0.03)	-0.387*** (0.04)	-0.383*** (0.04)	-0.382*** (0.04)	-0.374*** (0.04)
Socialization						
Family in Francoist side in the Civil War ^a			-0.449*** (0.14)	-0.384*** (0.14)	-0.377*** (0.14)	-0.386*** (0.15)
Family in Republican side in the Civil War ^a			0.271** (0.14)	0.183 (0.14)	0.178 (0.14)	0.121 (0.14)
Family talked about politics			-0.007 (0.07)	-0.042 (0.07)	-0.044	-0.050 (0.07)
Father's ideology			0.016 (0.03)	0.019 (0.03)	0.020 (0.03)	0.020 (0.03)
Victim of Francoism				0.366*** (0.13)	0.107 (0.36)	0.384*** (0.14)
Victim of Francoists in the Civil War				0.248* (0.13)	0.253* (0.13)	0.234* (0.13)
Age × Victimization					0.006 (0.01)	

(continued)

Table 3. (continued)

Symbols	M0	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
Regional Differences ^b						
Catalonia						
Basque country						
Cut Point 1	-2.666*** (0.35)	-3.803*** (0.35)	-3.365*** (0.38)	-3.410*** (0.38)	-3.463*** (0.38)	0.456*** (0.16)
Cut Point 2	-2.171*** (0.35)	-3.217*** (0.34)	-2.773*** (0.37)	-2.815*** (0.37)	-2.867*** (0.38)	1.464*** (0.36)
N	1,807	1,807	1,807	1,807	1,807	1,807
χ^2	24.772***	333.980***	351.872***	366.238***	366.817***	395.031***
Akaike information criterion	3082.796	2779.588	2769.696	2759.330	2760.750	2734.537

Logistic regression coefficients (standard errors)

a. The reference category comprises those who said their family sided with both sides during the Civil War.

b. The reference category comprises all other Spaniards.

* $p < .1$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$.




Figure 5. Ideology self-placement for victims and nonvictims

Table 4. Two-Sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov (K-S) Test for Equality of Distribution Functions

Smaller group	D	p value
Nonvictims	.00	1.00
Victims	–.12	.00
Combined K–S	.12	.00

However, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test performed on the distribution of self-reported victimized and non-victimized respondents reveals that the distribution of non-victims is more skewed to the right (Table 4). This indicates that endogeneity cannot be completely discarded.

Unfortunately, we do not have an instrumental variable for victimization or an experimental design, which would allow for a better identification strategy. We nevertheless believe that the fact that we have controlled for the effect of each of these variables (i.e., ideology and victimization) on the other by including them in the same regression model should give us some degree of methodological comfort.

To summarize, the general patterns identified in the results above are as follows: Respondent’s ideology and religiosity are decisive determinants of

support, more conservative and religious people being the most reluctant toward TJ policies. The fact that the Catholic Church, in contrast to what happened in countries such as Argentina, has never shown any regret for its support of Francoism (during both the Civil War and the dictatorship) may help to explain why, still today, religiosity is negatively associated with support for TJ measures. The effect of other individual-level variables is modest. Age is a relevant predictor of support, older respondents being less likely to support TJ. This variable appears to have a differential impact across town of residence; the effect of being older is stronger (more negative) in smaller towns, which matches the observed resistance to TJ policies in small villages (Aguilar, 2008a). Education is significant in only one of our models, although, interestingly enough, its coefficient has a negative sign in all models in the three tables.

Regarding the impact of family socialization, we find that, 70 years after the Civil War and more than 30 years after the dictatorship, reported victimization—suffered by the respondent or her or his relatives—is crucial in explaining current attitudes toward TJ. This conclusion suggests that more attention should be paid to personal and family experiences in the formation of political views and attitudes, especially if they are traumatic. In South Africa, Backer (2003) found significant differences between direct victims of the Apartheid and the rest of the population regarding satisfaction with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In Rwanda, a survey study of the ICTJ has also found that “personal experiences shaped respondents’ attitudes” (quoted in Thoms et al., 2008, p. 79).

In general, the impact of victimization is unrelated to the respondent’s age, which confirms the decisive importance of intergenerational transmission of views about traumatic events.³⁵ The only exception to this is the significant effect of the age parameter on support for trials (Table 2); one explanation could be that reparatory aspects of justice are more likely to be transmitted across generations than are retributive ones. This might also be indicative of the fact that the revenge impulse may fade over time, whereas the need to see the victims properly redressed may be more easily and frequently maintained.

Finally, we have found that contextual factors are relevant in explaining attitudes toward TJ policies. In this article we have focused on regional-level factors, which are intuitively very relevant in the Spanish case, with the Catalan and Basque minorities.³⁶ However, differences could also occur at other levels of aggregation: For example, Arjona (2009) has emphasized the importance of the municipal level for reparation policies in Colombia. The significance of these contextual differences will depend not only on the existence of different victimizing experiences but also on some degree of collective self-awareness and mechanisms for its reproduction.

Conclusion

Frequently starting from normative rather than empirically demonstrated assumptions, the TJ literature has traditionally focused on the different strategies developed by political actors either to promote or to oppose institutional arrangements aimed either at redressing victims or at bringing perpetrators to justice. In doing so, there has been a tendency to disregard public opinion toward TJ policies. This is unfortunate, as the use of surveys gives us “a better sense of how pro- and anti-TJ constituencies emerge” (Thoms et al., 2008, pp. 47, 78).

This article, which has sought to explain determinants of popular attitudes toward TJ in contemporary Spain, represents a contribution to the specialized literature on the topic. We have analyzed TJ as disaggregated in different types of measures, which can be either complementary or alternative to each other. We have observed that variation in support for TJ interventions issues from a combination of individual and family-level (socialization) variables. In general terms, those who are more likely to support these measures are people who are closer to the left, younger, and nonreligious but also people whose families sided with the Republicans during the Civil War and/or were victimized during the dictatorship. We have also identified some contextual (regional) differences that make the likelihood of supporting TJ greater in those parts of the country where strong and differentiated ethnic or national identities prevail.

Although the findings related to ideology, religiosity, age, and town size may be dependent on the specificities of Spain (even though some could be relevant in other cases), a lesson that transcends this case is that policies that are perceived as being less aggressive, such as withdrawing symbols of the past (something that does not entail digging into the past to identify human rights violations and perpetrators), are more widely supported by the citizenry. In contrast, measures perceived as more risky (i.e., creation of truth commissions and holding of trials) are less widely supported by citizens. The importance of differentiating between the more moderate and the more radical instruments, and even attempts to create an ordered scale or a “spectrum” of TJ policies, has started to be considered in the literature (Grodsky, 2009; Payne et al., 2008). TJ measures do not appear to be reducible to a single dimension; and depending on their nature, different interventions are likely to generate different levels of popular support.

The results illustrate the long-term relevance of victimization and socialization on political identities. On the one hand, individuals do not seem to be forgetful of their history; that is, the mere passage of time does not necessarily contribute to oblivion. In Spain, the lack of appropriate TJ measures may have prevented victims and their relatives from leaving the past behind. On the

other hand, the condition of victim, which may be more or less specific (i.e., relating to the family or the political community), seems to travel from one generation to another and to have clear-cut political consequences. Interestingly, Carmil and Breznitz (1990) reached a similar conclusion in their research on the effect of the trauma derived from the Holocaust experience on both the survivors and their descendants. Indeed, even though in this article we have focused on attitudes toward TJ policies, the effects of victimizing experiences are likely to be broader (e.g., on political identities; Balcells, 2007; Wood, 2008).

To conclude, our work underscores the importance of micro-level data for the study of TJ, which can reveal unpredicted empirical patterns. For example, at the mere descriptive level, our study has clarified the views of Spaniards regarding TJ issues. Our data demonstrate that, contrary to what has been commonly assumed, Spaniards are quite supportive of the application of TJ policies.³⁷ Indeed the data indicate that the average Spanish citizen would have endorsed a more ambitious legal application of TJ principles than that provided for in the 2007 Law of Historical Memory.

Appendix

Descriptive Statistics

Variable name	N	M	SD	Min	Max
Trials	2,525	2.36	0.87	1	3
Symbols	2,667	2.49	0.81	1	3
Monuments	2,617	2.50	0.80	1	3
Commissions	2,426	0.52	0.49	0	1
Age	2,936	47.17	18.15	18	99
Town size	2,936	3.87	1.65	1	7
Interest in politics	2,919	2.08	0.88	1	4
Education	2,929	1.91	0.70	1	3
Religiosity	2,868	2.50	1.35	1	6
Ideology	2,435	4.39	1.74	1	10
Victim of Francoism	2,936	0.24	0.42	0	1
Victim of Francoists in Civil War	2,936	0.31	0.46	0	1
Family on Francoist side in Civil War	2,936	0.15	0.36	0	1
Family on Republican side in Civil War	2,936	0.32	0.46	0	1
Family talked about politics	2,854	1.91	0.82	1	4
Father's ideology	2,103	4.82	2.21	1	10
Catalonia	2,936	0.23	0.42	0	1
Basque country	2,936	0.23	0.42	0	1

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Notes

1. The first category includes trials, annulment of auto-amnesties approved by officials of the previous regime, legislation expropriating illegitimately acquired assets of former authoritarian parties, lustration or purging of individuals actively involved with the authoritarian regime. Reparation ranges from various forms of material compensatory policies (e.g., restitution of confiscated property rights or provision of pensions to the victims or their families) to symbolic measures (e.g., memorials to the victims or official apologies). Truth revelation procedures normally entail the creation of commissions and/or the declassification of secret police archives.
2. See, among others, Kritz (1995), McAdams (1997), Teitel (2000), Barahona de Brito, González-Enríquez, and Aguilar (2001), Elster (1998, 2004, 2006), Nalepa (2008, 2010), and De Greiff (n.d.).
3. Although the latter caveat applies to any policy, it is particularly relevant in the case of transitional justice (TJ) for a number of reasons: First, civil society is likely to be weakened in the aftermath of an authoritarian experience and/or a violent conflict, and organizational resources to lobby for TJ are likely to be scarce. Second, even if there is an underlying desire for these type of measures in society, people are not likely to openly request them for fear of political destabilization, residual power of the repressive actors, and the like. Finally, pressures exerted by a number of social actors aimed at advancing TJ may simply be

- representative of a few groups with highly intense preferences (i.e., victims and their relatives) and not of the society in general.
4. A notable exception is Gibson's (2002, 2004a, 2004b) research in South Africa. Through representative surveys at the national level, his research has focused on the reconciliatory effects of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as well as on the social perception of justice derived from this institution. Nalepa (2008, 2010) has also implemented representative surveys in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic on matters related to TJ policies. Other studies based on survey research are listed in Thoms, Ron, and Paris (2008, pp. 78-85).
 5. The estimated death toll during the Civil War was 800,000, of which around 122,000 are estimated to be civilian victims of intentional lethal violence—of these, 81,095 were victims of Francoist violence and 37,843 were victims of leftist violence (Juliá, 2004). These figures have to be read with the caveat that only half of the Spanish provinces have been researched in-depth to date.
 6. Aguilar (2008b) argues that a crucial factor explaining the resurgence of this debate is the arrival in the public sphere of the “grandchildren of the war,” who were free from the fears and guilt of their parents. Davis (2005, p. 868) has pointed to the importance of Pinochet's arrest in London—after an initiative by the Spanish judge Baltasar Garzón—in understanding these changes.
 7. Official State Gazette No. 310, of December 27, 2007, p. 53410. It is referred to in this article as the “Law of Historical Memory,” the name it has been given in the mass media.
 8. See, for example, Nalepa (2007) for Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary; David and Choi (2006) for the Czech Republic; Theidon (2006) for Peru; Gibson (2002, 2004a, 2004b, 2007) for South Africa; and Biro et al. (2004) for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia.
 9. The effect of the perceived threat from members linked to the authoritarian regime is studied by Nalepa (2007), who finds it to be a significant predictor of attitudes toward lustration in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. This factor was also found to be significant in South Africa (Gibson, 2004b).
 10. On trauma and fear arising from repression in authoritarian regimes, see Koonings and Kruijt (1999).
 11. In Spain, leftist ideology can be expected to be associated with support for TJ policies. The opposite would apply in other contexts (i.e., postcommunist settings).
 12. Nonetheless, we empirically explore a different set of interactions of crucial variables.
 13. The Basque Country and Catalonia are overrepresented, with 699 and 683 respondents, respectively. In our analyses, we take into account this overrepresentation so that the results are perfectly representative of the whole country.

14. The response options are 1 = *yes*, 2 = *no*, 3 = *doesn't know*, 4 = *doesn't answer*. We built a dummy variable with values of 1 = *yes*, 0 = *no*.
15. Responses are measured on a scale from 1 to 3 where 1 = *completely disagree*, 2 = *neither agree nor disagree*, 3 = *completely agree*.
16. The same scale as in Point 2 applies.
17. Town size is entered as an ordinal variable (on a 1-7 scale) following the usual coding in CIS surveys. The categories are: 1 = *2,000 or fewer inhabitants*, 2 = *between 2,001 and 10,000*, 3 = *between 10,001 and 50,000*, 4 = *between 50,001 and 100,000*, 5 = *between 100,001 and 400,000*, 6 = *between 400,001 and 1,000,000*, 7 = *more than 1,000,000*.
18. We used the survey question "Could you tell me if you are interested in politics in general?" Possible responses are 4 = *very much*, 3 = *quite a lot*, 2 = *a little*, 1 = *not at all*.
19. Education and interest in politics are two mandatory controls in our estimation since individuals scoring higher in one or both are much less likely to give a "does not know" type of answer. Adding these controls helps to avoid sample bias.
20. The variable has a value of 1 for *primary education or less*, 2 for *secondary education*, and 3 for *university degree*.
21. This is a scalar variable that goes from 1 to 6, where 1 is *nonreligious* (i.e., the respondent identifies herself or himself as atheistic or nonreligious) and 6 is *highly religious* (i.e., the respondent says that she or he goes to mass several days a week).
22. Although the impact of religion on Spanish politics is not as strong as it used to be, it remains a significant factor explaining voting and electoral competition (Montero, Calvo, & Martínez, 2008).
23. This variable measures the self-reported position on the left-right scale ranging from 1 (*extreme left*) to 10 (*extreme right*).
24. We measure this with the question, "As far as you can remember, which of the two sides that fought the Civil War did your family most identify with, the Republicans or the Nationalists?" (*Nationalists* is the name that was given to Franco's supporters during the Civil War). Possible responses are 1 = *Nationalist*, 2 = *Republicans*, 3 = *both*, 4 = *neither*. This question has been used in previous surveys conducted by the CIS. In our survey, the response rate to this question (77%) was higher than in any previous one. We include this variable in the regressions as two different dummies: *family Nationalist side* and *family Republican side*.
25. We used the survey question "When you were a child or adolescent, how much did they talk about politics at home?": 4 = *very much*, 3 = *quite a lot*, 2 = *a little*, 1 = *not at all*.

26. To be consistent with the traditional male preeminence in Spanish culture, we use the father's position on the ideological scale. The correlation between the father's ideology and the mother's is very high (.77), so we cannot include both of them in the same regressions. Using the mother's ideology does not change our results (these are available on request). Since our indicator was reported by the respondent, some bias may exist (i.e., the respondent bringing her or his father closer to her or his ideological positions). Yet the correlation between the respondent's ideology and her or his father's is not dramatically high (.55).
27. We do not take into account victimization by the Republican side during the Civil War, as we would not expect this to have straightforward effects on attitudes toward TJ. As we explained, victims of the Republican side received reparations in the past. Current TJ measures are connected to reparations for Francoist violations.
28. Victimization includes any of the following: death in combat, death in bombardment, homicide, death penalty, disappearance, imprisonment, flight from Spain, forced into hiding, and expelled from work. We label this variable *victim of Nationalist side during CW*.
29. This includes any of the following: arrest, imprisonment, expelled from work, fined, forced to leave the country, executed. We label this variable *victim of Francoism*.
30. Because of the limited number of cases in the group of people with direct victimizing experiences, we include family and individual victimization experiences together. We have also run analyses without those with personal victimizing experiences, and the results are consistent.
31. According to Thoms et al. (2008, p. 81), "Different regions . . . are likely to have quite different views on TJ," and they recommend "oversampling," as we have done in our study.
32. The rate of "doesn't know" responses is 16.12% for truth commissions, 14.70% for trials, and 9.91% for symbols. We must bear in mind that the question about the creation of a truth commission had a different set of response categories than the others; in this case, the intermediate category of "indifferent" was absent, which may have pushed the respondents toward either one of the two extremes (agree-disagree) or DK.
33. Note that missing data leads to a reduction in the size of the sample used for the estimations of models presented in Tables 1, 2, and 3. Reestimating them using selection models that correct for potential selection bias in our dependent variables does not change our conclusions.
34. Though we do not have enough space to elaborate on the differences between Basques and Catalans regarding their support of TJ policies, one explanation could be that Basque nationalism is more extreme than Catalan nationalism. Although in the Basque Country there is a significant tendency to consider Spanish

and Basque identities as incompatible, in Catalonia dual identities (people feeling simultaneously Spanish and Catalan) are more frequent (this can be seen in our survey, available on request). Given that Francoism was characterized by the aggressive imposition of Spanish identity and the repression of minority identities, a more extreme ethnic identity may be leaning toward a greater support for TJ measures.

35. Similarly, in the South African case it has been confirmed that “young blacks are not more likely to be reconciled than older blacks” (Gibson, 2004b, p. 215).
36. This result ties in with Gibson’s (2004a) finding regarding the importance of racial identities in explaining the acceptance of TJ measures in South Africa.
37. In fact, in most of the few existing studies based on survey data, support for TJ measures is more common than the opposite (Thoms et al., 2008, p. 78).

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